Introduction
The decision for financially distressed borrowers about how to file for formal insolvency-via bankruptcy or debt restructuring, is complicated. Filing for bankruptcy results in a "fresh start", whereby almost all debt is forgiven and creditors must cease collection action. A bankruptcy flag remains, however, on the debtor's file, and access to credit can be more difficult/expensive. Han and Li (2011) , for example, find that recent bankruptcy filers have less access to unsecured credit than individuals who have never filed for bankruptcy, and are more likely to use expensive lending sources. 1 Filing a proposal, on the other hand, involves a formal restructuring plan with reduced debt repayment over a 3-to 5-year period. Filers keep their assets and benefit from remaining in the credit market as long as the plan is followed. Credit bureaus also record proposals differently than bankruptcies and for a shorter time frame (3 years compared with 7). The quantitative implications of proposals (Chapter 13 in the U.S.), however, are less well documented than for bankruptcy. Sullivan et al. (2001) document that the majority of Chapter 13 filings end up in bankruptcy within a year. More recently, Dobbie and Song (2015) and find that Chapter 13 can lead to benefits in terms of financial outcomes, labor earnings, and even mortality risk.
In September 2009, the Canadian government passed legislation to encourage proposals. The highlighted benefits included lower administrative costs for consumers and higher recovery rates for financial institutions.
2 The amendments to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) included increasing the maximum debt limit (excluding debt secured by principal residence) for filing a consumer proposal (Division II), allowing consumers to escape the more onerous Division I proposal (sometimes referred to as a commercial proposal). It also increased the cost of filing for bankruptcy for high-income debtors. Specifically, it codified that 1 Han et al. (2015) find that recent filers can access credit cards but at more expensive rates, and have lower limits than those offered to non-filers. Cohen-Cole et al. (2009) document that the time period during which bankruptcy filers are excluded from the credit market is relatively short.
2 Eraslan and Sarte (2007) provide some evidence that strict debt restructuring regulations might not necessarily lead to higher recovery rates, as it depends on how consumers respond while repaying their debt. 1 all high-income debtors face wage garnishment for 21 months compared with 9 months plus trustee discretion. In some ways, the change in Canadian legislation was similar to changes in the U.S. in 2005, although less punitive to debtors.
Swayed by creditors, the U.S. Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) in 2005, increasing the cost of bankruptcy, and introduced income-testing to steer debtors into debt restructuring. Albanesi and Nosal (2015) document how the BAPCPA was only successful in decreasing the number of bankruptcies, as a larger fraction of insolvent individuals actually do not file because of the increased cost of filing. 3 In Canada, we observe a dramatic increase in proposals following the 2009 BIA amendments. The BIA amendments were successful in that we observe a 92% increase in the more cost-effective Division II proposals relative to expensive Division I proposals. In addition, proposals increased 13% relative to bankruptcies. Furthermore, we document that this increase is mostly in provinces without generous asset exemptions (including homestead exemptions); we see a threetimes larger increase in proposals in provinces without these exemptions relative to provinces with them. This is consistent with Mitman (2015) , who documents a lower share of Chapter 13 filings in higher homestead exemption states. We also document that unemployed debtors are largely unaffected by the policy change, as their best option is to file for bankruptcy.
To identify the impact of the 2009 BIA amendments on households' insolvency choices, we use administrative data on the population of insolvency filings in Canada and rely on a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy to identify the average treatment effect of the amendments on the choice of insolvency instrument for insolvent households. We combine two sources of variation, before/after 2009 and just below/above a liabilities threshold. The liabilities threshold is such that, prior to September 2009, debtors with non-principal residence liabilities above $75,000 could not file the more cost-effective Division II proposal. The intuition for our identification strategy is straightforward: the DiD estimator takes the difference between the cross-sectional discontinuity at $75,000 after 2009 and the cross-sectional discontinuity at $75,000 before 2009. This difference represents the causal impact of the policy change.
Finally, given our findings that proposals increase relative to bankruptcies we ask: what is the value to borrowers of the increasing relative rate of proposals? Given the well-known trade-off between risk-sharing and commitment associated with different insolvency designs (Zame (1993) ), a by-product of an increase in proposals should be that banks are more willing to lend and do so at lower rates. 4 Serra (2008) , for example, finds that lenders in Canada recover up to 40% in the case of proposals and that in the case of bankruptcy creditors receive less than 10%.
5 Consistent with this, we document, using bank data, a decline in write-offs relative to 90-day delinquencies post-amendments, and an increase in recoveries.
To analyze the impact of the amendments on credit access, however, we cannot simply analyze the debt of insolvent filers. This is because we would like to know either the benefits to defaulters in the long run of filing a proposal (as in Dobbie and Song (2015) and ) or the benefit to the average borrower of the new insolvency regime. We use aggregated data on credit card limits by credit score and data on credit card offer sheets to examine the impact of the 2009 BIA amendments on the latter. We use provincial differences in asset exemption generosity as exogenous variation in the relative attractiveness of bankruptcy versus proposal. Since the 2009 BIA amendments did little to increase the attractiveness of proposals in provinces with generous asset exemptions, these provinces form a plausible control group. Using our policy amendment as an exogenous change to insolvency options therefore allows us to document the impact of a reform meant to encourage proposals on credit access. An increase in proposals at the expense of bankruptcy should lead to an increase in credit access. On the other hand, an absolute increase in proposals will have a muted impact on credit access. By us-ing information on credit card limits, we are able to focus on supply responses rather than demand. We do not find that the increase in proposals had an impact on overall credit access. Finally, we compare the credit card offer sheets before and after the 2009 BIA amendments. We do not find rates falling at the time of the changes. If anything, we observe rates increasing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional environment, in particular, the two options for consumers filing insolvency in Canada and the 2009 amendments to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. Section 3 presents a detailed analysis of the data, including a description of assets and liabilities of individuals filing for insolvency as well as the main creditors. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Institutional Details
Consumer insolvencies in Canada are governed by the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and supervised by the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB), the national regulator. In September 2009, Chapter 36 of the Statutes of Canada was enacted, making amendments to the BIA. The amendments came into force in stages, the first in July 2008 and the second in September 2009. In 2008, the government decreased the non-dischargeable period for student loans from 10 years to 7. In 2009, amendments were made to encourage Division II proposals. The debt limit (excluding debt secured by principal residence) for Division II proposals was increased from $75,000 to $250,000, thereby allowing consumers to file Division II proposals rather than Division I proposals if they had less debt than the new limit. Furthermore, the length of time bankruptcy filers with surplus income had their wages garnished was increased from 9 months to 21 months. The focus of this paper is on the 2009 amendments, given that student loans are only a small fraction of total liabilities among defaulters in Canada.
For individuals who are insolvent there are two types of bankruptcy: ordinary and summary; and two types of proposals: Division I and Division II. Both bankruptcy and proposals stop most collection actions and terminate the accu-4 mulation of interest accruing on unsecured debt. Under bankruptcy, most debt is written off in return for asset liquidation. The difference in types of bankruptcies is in the value of assets. An ordinary administration bankruptcy is for individuals with more than $15,000 in assets and a summary bankruptcy is for individuals with less. The costs of an ordinary bankruptcy can be more more substantial than a summary bankruptcy; therefore most individuals with more than $15,000 in assets would file a proposal. We do not differentiate bankruptcy types in our analysis.
Under bankruptcy, a trustee might sell, lease, borrow against, or apportion to the creditors any non-exempt property of the bankrupt. The property of a bankrupt that is exempt from seizure varies by province. 6 The higher the asset exemption level, the more the debtor is protected during bankruptcy. The bankrupt may also be required to make payments from subsequently earned surplus income for distribution to the creditors. The more surplus income, the more a bankrupt is required to contribute. Bankruptcy trustees calculate surplus income as income less allowable expenses. First-time bankrupts with surplus income of more than $200 per month are obliged to contribute 50% of this income towards repaying debts to their creditors for 21 months after the date of bankruptcy and before the discharge. Before the amendments, these filers were able to obtain an automatic discharge as early as 9 months after the date of bankruptcy. 7 Approximately 14% of filers have surplus income. This number is relatively constant over our sample and uncorrelated with the 2009 BIA amendments. Moreover, the bankrupt is also required to participate in two mandatory financial counseling sessions. First-time bankruptcy filers who fulfill all the requirements set out by the courts are automatically discharged of their debt after a period of 9 months (standard) to 21 months (in the cases where someone has sur- 6 The most important exemptions are food and heating fuel, health aids, clothing, furniture, the tools of one's trade, farmland, animals, equipment, and supplies, pensions or retirement savings. Additional exemptions include any property the bankrupt holds in trust for another person (e.g. registered education plans); government prescribed savings plans (e.g. Registered Retirement Saving Plans (RRSPs) except for contributions with one year of filing); or prescribed payments relating to the essential needs of an individual. Table A1 in the Appendix lists the main exemptions.
plus income) and make a "fresh start." 8, 9 Bankruptcies remain on an individual's credit report (R9) for 6 to 7 years, depending on the province.
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In contrast to bankruptcy, consumer proposals are meant to modify unsecured debt payments as secured debt payments are unchanged. The main difference between proposal types is process, and this is driven by accessibility. Consumers cannot file Division II if they have liabilities (excluding debt secured by principal residence) totalling more than $75,000 prior to 18 September 2009 and $250,000 after 18 September 2009. The rationale of the 2009 BIA amendments was to "channel more debtors into the simpler and more cost-effective consumer proposal scheme."
11 The nature of the cost-effectiveness of Division II is both for borrowers and lenders. The repayment schedule under a proposal must be completed within 5 years. A Division I is available to both businesses and consumers and there is no limit with respect to how much money is owed. To ensure approval, a Division I proposal requires a 50% plus one majority in the number of creditors, a two-thirds majority in dollar value, and court approval. A Division II proposal requires only a simple majority of creditors to ensure approval. Division II proposals are either approved or rejected by ordinary resolution and are deemed approved by the Courts if no requests have been received to have the Court review the proposal. In a Division II proposal, an automatic bankruptcy does not occur if there is disagreement among creditors. Overall, Division II is faster and cheaper relative to Division I. If debtors default on the proposal, the creditor is allowed to garnishee debtors' income, seize their bank accounts, or intercept their tax returns. A proposal is flagged on a credit report for 3 years (designated R7). As of 18 September 2009, debtors are considered in default if they have missed an equivalent of 3 payments. Prior to that, debtors were considered in default for missing a single payment. An important rationale for the 2009 BIA amendments was keeping consumers in the proposal stream rather than forcing them into bankruptcy.
There are important differences in administrative fees for individuals considering their insolvency options, with fees being higher under Division I. This ultimately reduces the proceeds distributed to the creditors and, therefore, reduces the chances of the proposal being approved. Finally, if a Division I proposal is rejected, the debtor is automatically bankrupt. Fees are set by the BIA and depend on the amount owed. Although bankruptcy fees in Canada can reach into the thousands, the typical bankruptcy fees in Canada add up to approximately $1,600 (Ben-Ishai and Schwartz (2007)). Bankruptcy fees include required counseling sessions. The typical fee for proposals is two charges of $750 and 20% of what is distributed to creditors. The upfront cost of filing a proposal is therefore similar to the upfront cost of filing for bankruptcy. The maximum distribution amount is equal to non-exempt assets less total liabilities plus unsecured liabilities. For the average proposal filing, this is equal to $15,600; therefore the trustee collects on average $3,120 for a proposal. This is money not distributed to creditors.
Data
In this section, we provide details on the consumer-level data used in this paper, as well as complementary data on city-level employment and key census variables. A discussion of the credit data is left for section 4.2.
Consumer bankruptcy data
The main data set consists of individual-level insolvency filings provided by the OSB from March 2007 to March 2012. In December 2002, the OSB started collecting insolvency filings electronically, and by 2007 all filings were done electronically. We use data 30 months before and after the change in bankruptcy policy. We drop the day of the announcement and two days before and after the announcement in case of any errors with filing dates. In addition to socio-demographic information on the filer (age, marital status, employment status, home postal code), we have information on income and expenses, as well as a detailed breakdown of assets (15 categories), liabilities (10 categories), and creditors. 12 The key variable in this study is total liabilities (excluding debt secured by principal residence) at the individual level. Total liabilities (excluding debt secured by principal residence) is our assignment variable and it determines our treatment and control groups. Unsecured liabilities form the majority of total liabilities as most filers are renters. Preferred creditors are included as well. They do not have access to secured property but are paid out before unsecured creditors in situations where there are returns on sold assets. We define the treatment group as individuals who have debt (excluding debt secured by principal residence) greater than $75,000 and less than $250,000 when filing for the first time. The control group are individuals who have debt (excluding debt secured by principal residence) of less than $75,000. We further restrict the sample to ensure that there is no difference in manipulative sorting around the cut-off between the pre-and post-treatment period. To be precise, we focus on individuals "close" to the $75,000 cut-off, where "close" is defined as twice the optimal bandwidth, where the bandwidth is chosen based on Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) . Table 1 provides some information on debtors over our quasi-experiment window for both the control and treatment groups. The sample size is from March 2007 to March 2012 and includes 63,008 observations divided between the control group pre-and post-amendments, with 37.7% in the treatment group and 53.5% observed post-amendments. "Non-principal res. debt" is total liabilities excluding debt secured by principal residence. Total and employment income are individual monthly reported. All the liabilities, assets, and income categories are adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index (base 2002). Assets are based on estimated realizable amounts. Total liabilities include secured, preferred, and unsecured. FBB stands for financial benefit of bankruptcy and reflects the costs and benefits from bankruptcy. All continuous variables except age are in Canadian dollars. The sample size is based on twice the bandwidth as shown by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) .
Control/Before
Control/After Mean S.D. Figure 1 shows the evolution of proposals and bankruptcies over the sample period. One observation from this graph is that there is no run-up in filings preamendments. This is in contrast to the U.S. experience prior to the implementation of the BAPCPA. The increase in bankruptcies in late 2008 and early 2009 is related to the global recession. Bankruptcies actually start falling several months prior to September 2009. One likely reason we do not observe a spike in bankruptcies just prior to the rule change is that the amendments were advertised as a tool for highly indebted households to restructure their debt rather than an increase in cost for bankruptcy filings. The second observation from Figure 1 is that, following the 2009 BIA amendments, bankruptcies fall, proposals increase, and overall insolvencies are unchanged. In section 4 we present more precise evidence on total insolvencies and the lack of importance of the extensive margin in explaining consumer credit post-amendments. The most striking feature of the data presented in Table 1 is the increase in proposals for the treatment group, from 5.1% to 30.5%, in contrast to the control group, which increased from 22.2% to 31.5%. A part of this increase in proposals is from the relative increase in the number of homeowners filing for insolvency as a result of the 2009 recession. Homeowner insolvency in the treatment group went from 33.3% to 40.1%, whereas in the control group the increase in homeowner insolvency was smaller, from 34.4% to 37.6%. The fraction of filers who are unemployed did not increase. Unemployed debtors are more likely to file for bankruptcy. In addition, the average age and total income of filers is slightly higher post-amendments. Figure 2 into a control and treatment group, shedding light on the identification of the impact of the amendments on insolvency choice. Pre-amendments proposal rates are higher in the control group, although important for the DiD the trends are parallel. Post-amendments, we observe a large increase in proposals in the treatment group and a small increase in proposals in the control group. This suggests the gains from filing a proposal are deemed substantial by indebted households. These gains include reductions in administrative and legal costs as well as restructured loan repayment as opposed to wage garnishment for high-income filers. Similarly, Figure 2 panel (b) can be decomposed into treatment and control groups for proposal choice; see Figure 4 . Pre-amendment treatment-group filers did not have the option to file Division II. When given the option to do so, they take it. Post-amendments, therefore, we observe a very large increase in proposals in the treatment group. Figure 5 plots the fraction of filings that are proposals as a function of the number of creditors for two types of defaulters: those who owe the government (taxes 13 In our regression analysis, we control for filer as well as market characteristics given that in 2008-2009 there was a recession. Fieldhouse et al. (2012) document that the average age of defaulters was higher in the recession and incomes were lower. They also document that defaulters were more likely to be married over this period. Sullivan et al. (2003) document that the most common reason to file for Chapter 13 in the U.S. is home ownership. Domowitz and Sartain (1999) document that higher marriage rates, higher income, and higher equity-to-debt levels all lead to a greater propensity to file for debt restructuring over bankruptcy. and/or student loans) versus those who do not. For our purposes, multiple products from the same lender are counted as one creditor. The number of creditors ranges from 1 to 20; on average, a filer has 7 creditors.
14 The first observation is that, for a fixed number of creditors, the propensity to file a proposal is higher for debtors who do not have government debt. The tax collection agency is more likely to favor bankruptcy since taxes must still be paid in full under bankruptcy, and would not necessarily be under a proposal. The second observation is that the likelihood of a proposal is decreasing in the number of creditors after about 5 creditors. There are a number of potential reasons for this. One is that the benefit to restructuring some types of debt (e.g. higher-interest payday loans) might be too costly relative to the benefit, and the propensity to have more expensive debt is increasing in the number of creditors. 15 Another is that creditors might be more willing to renegotiate debt contracts with debtors who have a high concentration of their loans with them compared with competitors because they've invested in monitoring (Ergungor (2010) ). Returning to Table 1 , exempt assets increased post-amendments, as did nonexempt assets. Table A1 in the Appendix lists the main exemptions by province. Total liabilities increased substantially from an average of $130,826 to $146,466 for the control group and from $143,947 to $168,658 for the treatment group. In addition, non-exempt assets increased for both the control and treatment groups, largely due to the increase in homeowner filings. Table 1 also reports a measure of net financial benefit of bankruptcy (FBB, Fay et al. (2002) ). We report the FBB only for bankruptcies since the benefit for proposals depends crucially on the negotiated reduced repayment plan. Specifically, we define FBB by equation (1), which is the same as in Mikhed and Scholnick (2014) 
Government debtors
Filers without government debt 14 except that we also subtract 50% of surplus income.
where D is debt (excluding debt secured by principal residence); W is total assets minus total secured liabilities; E is total exempt assets; S is monthly surplus income; and m is the number of months a bankrupt has to pay surplus income-9 months prior to the 2009 amendments to the BIA and 21 months after the amendments. 16 The net gain from filing a bankruptcy, therefore, is the amount of unsecured liabilities that are wiped out after non-exempt assets are liquidated. On average, the net financial benefit of filing for bankruptcy for an individual in the control group is about $62,000 whereas it is about $76,000 in the treatment group. The differences in FBB suggest that the benefits of filing for bankruptcy are greater for filers with more than $75,000 in debt (excluding debt secured by principal residence). We do not see much of a difference in the pre-and post-amendments levels of FBB in either the control or treatment groups.
17 Table 2 shows the distribution of liabilities of all insolvencies for the regression period for the control/treatment groups, before and after the amendments. Mortgage debt increases for both the control and treatment groups as does credit card debt. The fraction of filers with a mortgage increases 8.8 percentage points in the treatment group and only 4.3 percentage points in the control group, providing some evidence that the distribution of defaulter-type shifted somewhat toward homeowners. Fieldhouse et al. (2012) attribute the increase in the number of homeowners filing for insolvency to the business cycle, which we control for in our econometric analysis given that homeowners are more likely to file a proposal than bankruptcy. Total credit card debt makes up the largest fraction of unsecured debt, followed by bank loans. Student loans are relatively flat in the control and treatment groups, averaging around $23,000 per filer, conditional on having a student loan. Between 10% and 12% of filers own student debt. Finally, the majority of filers have "other" debt. This includes debts to individuals such as lawyers, doctors, and friends. It also includes debts to utilities. The sample size is from March 2007 to March 2012 and includes 63,008 observations divided between the control group pre-and post-amendments with 37.7% in the treatment group and 53.5% observed post-amendments. There are three types of debt: unsecured, preferred, and secured. All dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index (base 2002). We consider 30 months before to 30 months after the bankruptcy amendments. Consumer bank loans are all bank loans excluding mortgages. Taxes include federal, provincial, and municipal taxes. "Other" includes payday loans, government other than taxes, utilities, and debts owed to lawyers, doctors, and individuals. Payday loans are less than 0.5% of total liabilities. The column I(owe) is an indicator variable, giving the percentage of filers in each category who defaulted. The main focus of analysis is on the impact of the 2009 BIA amendments on proposal choice. For this, we use data constructed as in Tables 1 and 2 . However, we are also interested in the impact of the policy change on access to credit. For this, we use credit bureau data provided by Equifax. For 11 credit score categories we observe both an average credit limit for new and existing credit cards by Canadian province and by quarter from 2007 to 2015. To estimate the impact of the 2009 BIA amendments on access to credit we need credible control and treatment groups. We take advantage of provincial differences in homestead exemptions and overall asset exemption generosity to sort provinces into a control group and treatment group. For example, there are provincial differences in recourse and auto exemptions; in particular, Alberta is a non-recourse province with the most generous asset-exemption levels. Saskatchewan also has a generous homestead exemption and is a non-recourse province for some first mortgages. 18 We should expect, therefore, that the impact of the amendments would be muted in Alberta and Saskatchewan and that these provinces serve as our control group. 19 The treatment group are the remaining provinces. An important reason to use a DiD approach is that Canada was booming in 2006-2007, and therefore credit limits were trending upwards; Canada was then hit by a recession in 2009 and access to credit is likely to be affected by this national event. It is also important to use regional variation in asset exemption levels because in January 2008 Canadian banks moved from Basel I to Basel II capital standards. The capital charge for credit cards went from 8% of balances to 4% of balances plus unused commitments. This in itself could lead to an increase or decrease in credit card limits.
Control
20 Using Alberta and Saskatchewan as a control group allows us to control for any potential impact of the change in capital requirements on overall lending, while isolating the impact of the amendments on credit card limits. We provide summary statistics for the credit bureau data in Table 3 . There are several take-aways. First, the average limit in the treatment group is lower than in the control group, both before and after the 2009 BIA amendments. This is different than Miller (2011) , who finds lower levels of unsecured credit in highversus low-asset exemption states. The argument in that paper is that higher interest rates on unsecured debt arising from higher exemption levels leads to less borrowing. 21 Second, the credit limit on existing accounts is higher than on new accounts. Third, utilization rates are approximately the same in the control and treatment groups before the change and both increase somewhat in the posthomes would in addition owe the difference between the recovered value of the house and the face value of the mortgage. 19 The foreclosure process in Alberta and Saskatchewan are also judicial rather than power of sale as it is, for example, in Ontario. This implies costly court involvement rather than simple liquidation.
20 Lang et al. (2008) conjecture that the move from Basel I to Basel II would lead to an increase in bank costs. In Canada, the average risk weight for undrawn commitments is about 20%, therefore the capital charge is about 2.3%. That said, Canadian banks have maintained a buffer of at least 2 percentage points above the tier 1 minimum of 8% total capital before and after the move to II.
21 Gropp et al. (1997) find that the demand for total household credit is greater in high-assetexemption states. Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) and Lin and White (2001) analyze the demand for mortgages and come to competing conclusions on the impact of state exemption levels.
period, where they average between 32% and 33% between 2009Q4-2011Q4. 
Supplementary data
We include city-level information from a number of sources. This includes monthly city-level employment data (Labour Force Survey) and information on financial literacy (based on the 2003 International Adult Literacy and Skills Survey), as well as census data on education, migration, ethnicity, housing, etc. Table  4 summarizes some of the key variables. Unemployment increased substantially over the sample period; however, the control and treatment markets' experiences are approximately the same. Population sizes are similar across groups as are rates of home ownership, financial literacy scores, and income.
Empirical Analysis
Our empirical strategy is as follows. We first use a DiD approach to measure the impact of the amendments to the BIA on the fraction of proposals that are filed as Division I versus II. Next, we examine the impact of the amendments to the BIA on the fraction of insolvencies that are proposals relative to bankruptcy. We further decompose the relative increase in proposals by province (based on homestead exemptions) and employment status. We also look at the net benefits of bankruptcy and the impact of the amendments on selection. Finally, we show that total insolvencies did not increase as a result of the BIA amendments.
In section 4.2 we examine the amendments' impact on credit card limits using credit bureau data. If proposals increase and repeat filings are rare, total access to credit should increase. 23 22 Using survey data on Canadians' credit card usage, Bilyk and Peterson (2015) show that, between 2009 and 2011, the average outstanding balance was approximately $2,200 and that slightly fewer than 50% of credit card users carried an outstanding balance. 23 The rate of repeat filing (defined as refiling within 5 years) is about 3.6% in our data set. 
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Impact of Policy on Proposals
We start with proposals. Tables 5 and 6 present results for different specifications of the following DiD estimator:
where, in Table 5 , P is the fraction of proposals that are Division II relative to I; and in Table 6 , P represents the fraction of total insolvencies that are proposals. In both cases D is the amendments indicator variable equal to 1 after 18 September 2009 and 0 otherwise; T is the treatment indicator, equal to 1 if treated and 0 otherwise. D drops out of the regressions because we include week fixed effects in all specifications. Treated individuals are those with total debt (excluding debt secured by principal residence) greater than $75,000. 24 Those in the control group are individuals with total debt (excluding debt secured by principal residence) less than $75,000. Individuals above $75,000 are considered treated because pre-amendments they could not file a Division II proposal, whereas after they could. Individuals below $75,000 are in the control group because both preand post-amendments they could file a proposal and are, therefore, unaffected by the amendments. We focus on individuals "close" to the 75,000 cut-off, which is defined as twice the optimal bandwidth to ensure there is no difference in manipulative sorting around the cut-off between the pre-and post-treatment period.
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Given the optimal bandwidth, our sample of filers includes only those with at least $60,928 in liabilities and no more than $89,072. The assumption is that individuals far away from the cut-off would not be affected by the change in regulation. We provide results in the Appendix with varying bandwidths. The parameter β captures the effect of bankruptcy amendments on the propensity to file (i) Division II versus Division I and (ii) a proposal versus bankruptcy. We compare a repeated cross-section of individuals (i) over 30 months (t) pre-amendments to 30 months post-amendments. This limits the possibility of confounding factors that might contaminate the estimate while also keeping a relatively large sample. Included in the covariates are the individual's age, marital status, home-ownership status, occupation, employment status, number of creditors, and an indicator variable for whether a filer has surplus income.
26 Also included are market-level characteristics such as monthly unemployment rates (census Division); controls for ethnicity, education, and housing; as well financial literacy (based on the 2003 national financial literacy survey). We also vary location fixed effects, using either province or FSA fixed effects, where an FSA is the first three digits of a debtor's home postal code. We also interact the amendments date indicator with filer characteristics to control for the possibility that these change with the policy. Table 5 presents results on the propensity to file Division II versus Division I proposals post-amendments-the primary target of the amendments. In all our specifications-column (1), where we include 2006 census variables and province fixed effects; column (2), which includes FSA fixed effects as well as year times province fixed effects; and column (3), which includes census variables and province fixed effects as well as province times year fixed effects and the amendments date interacted with demographic variables-we find the amendments led to a 91% to 93% increase in Division II proposals. 27 The results indicate that the policy change led the treatment group to behave like the control group once the regulatory restriction was removed, and highlights the benefits to debtors of being able to file a Division II proposal. Table 6 highlights the change in insolvency from bankruptcy to proposal following the amendments. Our estimate of the impact of the amendments on proposals is consistently around 13%, whether or not we include census-level variables or FSA fixed effects, or allow for changes in demographics and geographic distribution post-rule change. 28 Interacting the policy date with the debtor characteristics could be important as different debtor-types might file for proposal versus bankruptcy. For example, although we do not show all the debtor characteristics here, it is the case that debtors filing proposals are more likely to be employed, married, older, and own a home or other assets as well as have surplus income. An increase in debtors with surplus income will necessarily lead 27 In results not reported here, but available upon request, we implement a propensity scoring matching (PSM) estimator (Heckman et al. (1997) ) to estimate the average treatment effect. PSM DiD explicitly controls for differences in observable reasons why some debtors might file for Division I versus Division II by matching filers in the control and treatment groups that are 'similar'. The results are close to the OLS results, on the order of an 85% increase in Division II post-amendments. Similarly, we do not report results from the PSM DiD estimator for proposals versus bankruptcy below given that they are also similar to the OLS estimates. 28 As an aside, census-level unemployment does not significantly explain the decision to file a proposal. This result is similar to what is found in the mortgage default literature and explained in Gyourko and Tracy (2014) as substantial attenuation bias that results from using aggregate unemployment rather than individual-level unemployment as we do in this paper.
to more proposals, as will an increase in the number of homeowners, a situation that is happening for business-cycle reasons. 29 The interaction term allows us to control for any change in debtor-type occurring at the time of the policy change. In terms of surplus income, for example, there is a slight decrease in filers with surplus income overall, in particular for those filing a proposal; this suggests that the increase in surplus income overall is not generating the increase in proposals.
Columns (3)- (4) decompose the impact of the amendments on unemployed and employed filers. The impact on the unemployed is approximately one-third that of the impact on the employed. One must have a source of income to file for a proposal; therefore the surprise in this case, if any, is that there is any impact on the unemployed. Unemployed debtors should file for bankruptcy unless they have an important source of non-labor income (which could include housing equity or investment income). The decision to file a proposal rather than for bankruptcy could also be driven by marital status. Unemployed filers are married in about 55% of cases compared with 37% for employed bankruptcy filers.
One concern with our estimate is that it is capturing both the increase in proposals resulting from the increase in bankruptcy costs and the decrease in costs from filing a proposal. The difference in upfront costs for bankruptcy and proposals is minimal. Proposals involve two payments of $750 whereas bankruptcy fees are on average $1,600 over 12 months. The impact of the amendments on bankruptcy costs are therefore more likely originating from the increase in the period of wage garnishment from 9 months to 21 months for the 14% of filers with surplus income than from a change in fees. Recall that, in section 3, the FBB is larger in the treatment group than the control group; therefore the gains from bankruptcy are greater above the $75,000 threshold. To separately identify the individual effects of increasing bankruptcy costs and the decreasing costs in proposal filings in column (5)- (6), we compare the impact of the rule change in Alberta and Saskatchewan versus the rest of Canada. Alberta and Saskatchewan have the highest asset exemption levels under bankruptcy in Canada and therefore proposals are not as attractive. Any increase in proposals, therefore, should Table 5 : Impact of the BIA amendments on proposal filing being Division II The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the proposal was Division II and not Division I. Treatment group are filers with more than $75,000 but less than $89,072 in total debt (excluding debt secured by principal residence). The control group are filers with less than $75,000 in total debt but more than $60,928 (excluding debt secured by principal residence). Robust standard errors clustered at the FSA level are in parentheses. All specifications include week fixed effects. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) come from the increase in bankruptcy costs. The impact of the amendments in Alberta/Saskatchewan is dramatically lower than the rest of Canada, a 5.0% increase versus 13.8%. These results suggest that the increase in bankruptcy costs is about three times less important than the increase in benefits from filing a proposal. 30 Lastly, we look at the impact of the amendments on FBB. Fay et al. (2002) show a positive correlation between FBB and the decision to file for bankruptcy, sug-30 Mikhed and Scholnick (2014) highlight the role of distance as one reason debtors might not file for bankruptcy. This is in addition to other costs noted in the literature, such as fees (Gross et al. (2014) ) and stigma (Livshits et al. (2010) and Gross and Souleles (2002) ). These are all are level effects that either do not change with the amendments or affect the treatment and control groups equally, and are therefore wiped out by the DiD, leaving us with an estimate that is a measure of the impact of the amendments on insolvency choice. Table 6 : Impact of the BIA amendments on proposal filings Treatment group are filers with more than $75,000 but less than $89,072 in total debt (excluding debt secured by principal residence). The control group are filers with less than $75,000 in total debt (excluding debt secured by principal residence) (but more than $60,928). Robust standard errors clustered at the FSA level are in parentheses. All specifications include week fixed effects. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) gesting individuals behave strategically. More recently, Zhang et al. (2015) allow for debt accumulation and the bankruptcy decision to be determined jointly and do not find evidence of strategic behavior. Neither paper considers the option to restructure and what happens when the financial benefit of bankruptcy is exogenously decreased. We provide evidence in column (7) that the FBB is unaffected by the amendments. The result suggests that, conditional on filing for bankruptcy, the net benefits from bankruptcy were unaffected by the amendments. Given that the period of foregone wages increased from 9 months to 21 months, the FBB of bankruptcy should have mechanically fallen. The fact that it has not suggests selection into proposals for those filers who would have otherwise experienced an increase in bankruptcy costs. This suggests that the increase in bankruptcy costs is a non-negligible reason for filing a proposal.
Finally, we bring your attention back to Figure 3 . Consistent with the graph, the empirical results indicate that the policy change led to the treatment group behaving like the control group once the regulatory restriction was removed. The propensity to file a proposal is approximately 35% for both groups postamendments. As in the case of the choice within proposals, removing the liabilities constraint allowed highly indebted filers to make the same choices as lessindebted filers, and they chose to do so. Our results therefore quantify the impact that the 2009 BIA amendments had on the substitution out of bankruptcy and into proposals. An unintended consequence of the amendments could also be an increase in insolvencies, that is, consumers filing formal proposals who otherwise might have repaid their debt. We therefore use our DiD strategy to measure the impact of the 2009 amendments on the growth rate of total insolvencies. We do the same when examining the time-series variation in total insolvencies presented in Table  7 . We find that the 2009 amendments did not have a significant impact on total insolvencies, suggesting that our focus on the intensive margin is the right one and that the extensive margin impacts of the amendments were not significant.
Credit supply
An increase in proposals relative to bankruptcies should lead to lower loss given default rates among creditors. According to an analysis of over 5,000 cases of insolvent borrowers in Canada between 2004 , Serra (2008 found that lenders recovered between 10% and 40% in nearly two-thirds of cases and less than 10% in fewer than 5% of cases. In bankruptcy cases, nearly all creditors receive less than 10%. Panel (a) of Figure 6 provides some suggestive evidence that the policy led banks to have fewer write-offs post-amendments even though delinquency rates on non-mortgage loans (primarily credit cards) were increasing. In particular, recovery rates increase substantially in the 2009 recession even as the amount in delinquency increase; therefore write-offs decrease. Thus borrowers might have become riskier (even without changes in lending standards), for example due to changes in income risk (e.g. Barron et al. (2000) and Hacker (2006) ), but the cost to financial institutions of insolvency is lower. Given higher recovery rates, banks have an incentive to increase lending, even though 90-day delinquencies rates might be higher.
Note that panel (b) of Figure 6 shows that delinquencies and write-offs for mortgage credit move together pre-and post-amendments. This is not surprising given that the move from bankruptcy to proposals affects unsecured credit and not secured credit.
Credit card limits
With bank balance sheet data on delinquencies, recoveries, and write-offs as motivation, we switch from using insolvency filing data to credit bureau data provided by Equifax to test whether or not the 2009 BIA amendments led to an increase in credit access. Our identification for credit access depends on the variation between homestead provinces versus non-homestead provinces. Since Alberta and Saskatchewan have generous asset exemption levels, they are substantially less likely to substitute away from bankruptcy and into proposals following the 2009 BIA amendments relative to the rest of Canada. We would not expect, therefore, that these provinces experience a change in credit. We thus treat these provinces as our control provinces. We perform the following DiD for the period 3 quarters prior to the changes in the Bankruptcy Act and 3 quarters following the amendments. We also extend the post-window to 6 years to allow financial institutions time to adapt to the new, higher rate of proposals.
where y is either the log of credit card limit per existing account or log of credit card limit per new account. We are interested in β, which captures the effect of being in a non-homestead province (N H). By using credit card limits, we are measuring the response of lenders to the rule change and not demand. Results are presented in Table 8 . We find that the 2009 BIA amendments had no impact on any of the credit limit variables. Neither credit limits on existing accounts (columns (1)- (2)) or on new accounts (columns (3)- (4)) change as a result of the 2009 amendments and the increase in proposals. We note that credit card limits are not statistically different in the non-homestead provinces from the homestead provinces in all cases except for the second-lowest credit scores. The policy date coefficient is positive, capturing the upward trend in credit starting before the 2009 BIA amendments. One concern might be that the 2009 amendments also increased the cost of filing for bankruptcy. That is, the length of time high-income debtors now experience some wage garnishment is a certain 21 months versus 9 months plus discretion. If there are fewer individuals filing for bankruptcy in the control group, there might be an increase in credit overall, and therefore no differential impact of proposals. If this were the case, we would expect, as in Gropp et al. (1997) , to see a differential impact across borrower-type. In columns (5)- (8), we present results for access to credit at different credit score buckets, from lowest to highest. In Gropp et al. (1997) , as the total demand for credit increases lenders approve only the high-quality individuals. In our case, this would imply a muted impact on the high credit scores but a sizable impact on the low credit scores of the 2009 amendments. We do not find, however, any heterogeneous impacts. This provides further evidence that the 2009 amendments, although they did lead to an increase in proposals, did not lead to an increase in credit access. Credit bureau data provided on a quarterly basis by Equifax. An observation is a credit score-province-quarter for credit card limits, both existing and new lines. The dependent variable for the intensive margin (columns (1)- (2) and (5)- (8)) is the log of the credit limit per account. The dependent variable for the extensive margin (columns (3)- (4)) is the log of the credit limit on new accounts per new account. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. VARIABLES 
Credit card interest rates
Although there is no impact on credit card limits, financial institutions might have lowered interest rates as a reaction to the 2009 BIA amendments. The information we have on interest rates is less disaggregated than that on credit limits, but is nevertheless suggestive. The Financial Consumer Agency of Canada provided us with an annual list of the population of credit cards available to consumers over our sample period. This is the widest possible choice set of consumers, and not every individual will qualify for, or because of different annual fees, afford each card.
31 Figure 7 plots the dispersion in interest rates offered by the 3 different institutions (or institution types, such as retail, gas, etc.) over the period 2006-2012 where we subtract the 2-year treasury bill yield from the APR rate. 32 The average interest rate spread appears to increase somewhat between the beforeamendments and the after-amendments period, and dispersion decreases. Table  9 reports regression coefficients of rates and spreads on card characteristics such as whether or not the card has rewards or an annual fee, as well as the network (Visa, Mastercard, American Express), and an indicator for pre-2009 and 2009 and after. We provide estimates for two samples. In columns (1) and (2), we report estimates for banks and credit unions, that is, institutions with credit cards and that also offer a deposit account. In columns (4) and (5), we report estimates for non-banks. This includes credit card companies such as Citibank and Wells Fargo, but also retailers. To be consistent with the credit bureau data we use information on interest rates from 2007 to 2011. The average APR for the bank sample is unchanged after 2009; however, the spread does increase by 232 basis points. On the sample of non-banks, we find no effect on spreads and rates themselves actually fall (although only significant at the 10% level). Since credit cards are available nationally, we do not have good control and treatment groups to remove businesscycle effects, making it difficult to assign causality to the 2009 BIA amendments.
31 Furthermore, we know that credit card companies tend to target different segments through their mailing programs, e.g. Han et al. (2015) , and that card companies are more concerned with negative selection in periods of high credit relative to low credit risk (Agarwal et al. (2015) ). 32 We use the 2-year rate following Han et al. (2015) , although results are qualitatively similar with shorter terms such as the 1 and 3 months as well as 1 year.
Therefore these results should be interpreted with some caution. Finally, columns (3) and (6) report estimates for the differences coefficient on the interquartile range (IQR). The estimates suggest that dispersion fell by about 100 basis points in each sample. The fact that credit card rate dispersion fell post-amendments can be a sign of two factors, which can potentially explain why rates are unchanged following the amendments to the 2009 BIA. First, the 2008-2009 recession led to an increase in credit risk, compressing rates. From Figure 7 , we see that rates compressed both at the bottom and top of the rate distribution. Second, a decrease in competition as U.S. credit card companies exited the Canadian market likely also contributed to a decrease in spreads. Both of these factors may have offset any cuts that might have followed amendments to the 2009 BIA. Excludes outside values 
Conclusion
In 2009, the Canadian government reformed the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, increasing the attractiveness of Division II proposals and increasing the cost of bankruptcy. The two key benefits of proposals are filers are able to keep their assets and can maintain access to credit markets. Take-up of proposals increased by 13% following the change in legislation and has trended upward since. This would imply that individuals value the increased access to proposals, in addition to disliking the increase in wage garnishment associated with bankruptcy for those with high income. An expected benefit from laws making proposals more attractive than bankruptcy for individuals using this channel is that borrowers have greater access to cheaper credit ex ante. This paper documents that the 2009 BIA amendments led to a substantial increase in proposals without an increase in insolvencies. This shift, however, did not propel an extension in credit card limits, or it appears, a decrease in interest rates.
Our results come with some caveats. This paper explores the impact of bankruptcy reform on the decision to file for bankruptcy or proposal only. We do not fully capture the decision of people who would not have filed a proposal had it not been for the legislation. Exploring panel data sets with insolvency decisions to further explore the impact of the 2009 BIA amendments would help us better understand the extensive margin. Also, we do not have information on the interest rates charged for the cards actually chosen by consumers. It is possible that lenders responded to the reform by cutting rates on these specific cards. Lenders may have also cut interest rates on personal or auto loans rather than credit cards. Matching a data set on bankruptcy filers with a credit registry could shed additional light on how financial institutions responded to the bankruptcy reform. Table A2 : Impact of the Reform on proposal filings: robustness to bandwidth choice
The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the filing was a proposal and not a bankruptcy. Treatment group are filers with more than $75,000 but less than $75,000+h in total debt (excluding debt secured by principal residence). The control group are filers with less than $75,000 in debt (excluding debt secured by principal residence) (but more than $75,000-h). 'h' is solved using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth. Debtor and market characteristics included as controls as well as year times month fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the FSA level are in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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